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This paper provides an analysis of the European Commission (EC) decisions on state aid control using data 
on 550 state aid cases approved by the EC between 1998 and 2009.  More specifically, we measure the 
determinants of the duration of state aid, total budget of state aid and daily budget of state aid. By using 
these imperfect proxies, we try to identify the extent of European state aid control. Our results suggest that 
aid with multiple objectives to achieve has both longer durations and higher amounts of budget. We also 
find that for some aid objectives or industries, the EC approves cases of aid with both longer durations and 
higher levels of budget. On the other hand, for some class of aid objectives and industries, there is a trade-
off between duration and the level of budget so as to counter-balance the undesired effects. The 
interpretation of the results imply that the European state aid control, which once was originally intended to 
address concerns about export subsidies and strategic trade, recently puts more emphasis on market failures 
mostly associated with externalities and public goods. 
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1. Introduction 
Governments tend to give financial support to companies in numerous ways owing to their 
incentives to shift a larger share of rents to be earned in the market to their sides. Generally, 
this form of financial aid has the impact of distorting competition in the internal market. The 
purpose of European state aid control is to enable European member states to grant state aid to 
address real market failures while avoiding the distortions of competition that this type of 
state intervention might give rise to.  
 
The objective of this paper is to provide an analysis of the European Commission (EC) 
decisions on state aid control. In doing so, we adopt a positive approach rather than a 
normative approach, explaining what the state of affairs is instead of what the state of affairs 
ought to be. We characterize the last decade of European state aid control policy in summary 
statistics and, detailed quantile regression and duration analysis on 550 state aid cases in total.  
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This paper is not the first attempt to analyze the EC’s decisions on antitrust issues. Previously, 
Carree et al. (2010) have provided a statistical analysis of all 538 formal Commission 
decisions under Articles 81, 82, and 86 of the European Community Treaty (cases of state aid 
excluded). Using a sample of 96 mergers notified to the European Commission and logit 
regression techniques, Bergman et al. (2005) analyze the Commission’s merger decision 
process. On the other hand, Gual and Mas (2010) examine all of the European Commission’s 
decisions on antitrust cases between January 1999 and February 2004 to check if the 
Commission’s decisions are correlated to certain industry characteristics that are supposed to 
have impact on anti-competitive behavior by economic theory. In like manner, the utilization 
of duration analysis in the field of antitrust economics is not a new phenomenon. For instance, 
there are studies1
 
 that perform duration analysis by employing cartel duration as an imperfect 
proxy to gauge cartel performance.  
In our paper, we consider three imperfect proxies to measure the impact of state aid: duration 
of state aid, total budget of state aid and daily budget of state aid. By using these imperfect 
proxies, we try to identify the extent of European state aid control. We are well aware of that 
both duration and budget information are clearly unsatisfactory in capturing the economic 
impact of state aid. It might be the case that state aid has continued to exist on paper for 
months with little impact on market structure. Alternatively, even though billions of Euros 
have been spent for the sake of aid, it might have little sustained effect on, say, facilitating 
economic activities in an industry. Ideally, we would like to compare the prices, number of 
firms, competition level, profits and so on that prevailed with what would have occurred 
absent the state aid. However, in order to perform this kind of rigorous counterfactual analysis 
we need very detailed and specific information for cases of aid, which is clearly missing in the 
current set up.  
 
Our results suggest that aid with multiple objectives to achieve has both longer durations and 
higher amounts of budget. Our findings also reveal that for some aid objectives or industries, 
the EC approves aid with both a long duration and a high budget. Among these objectives, 
there are environmental protection aid, which is thought to be in the sphere of negative 
externalities, and aid given for services of general economic interest (SGEI), which occupy a 
                                                 
1 Eckbo (1976), Griffin (1989),  Marquez (1994), Suslow (2005), Posner (1970), Dick (1996), Gallo et al. 
(2000), Jacquemin et al. (1981), and Levenstein and Suslow (2006) 
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specific position in the economies of the member states of EU. As to the industries, real estate 
activities sector draws special attention, as it is an example to the industries that can be 
characterized as being industries where public goods are not provided by the market up to an 
efficient level because it is not lucrative to do so. On the other hand, for some class of aid 
objectives and industries, there is a trade-off between duration and the level of budget so as to 
counter-balance the undesired effects. Aid given as a remedy for serious disturbance in the 
economy or aid given to the industries of public administration and defense; compulsory 
social security can be given as examples. 
 
According to Heidhues and Nitsche (2006) it is obvious that EU state aid control has evolved 
over time. What once was originally intended to address concerns about export subsidies and 
strategic trade has now become Article 107 TFEU, which is the legal basis for state aid 
control in Europe. In the light of the findings above, the emphasis of state aid control is more 
on market failures mostly associated with externalities and public goods.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: The following section presents an 
extensive review of the literature examining incentives of governments to provide state aid 
together with the review of the literature on distortionary impact of state aid. In Section III, 
we explain the legal framework about state aid control in Europe and describe the data used in 
this study. In Section IV, we present the estimation strategy and introduce various 
specifications. In Section V, we report the estimation results. Finally, we discuss the findings 
and conclude in Section VI.    
 
2. A Pure Economic Approach to European State Aid: An 
Overview 
Even though limited interest was shown in the economic analysis of state aid by scholars, 
recently there has been vivacity in this “virgin” field of antitrust economics, which can be 
seen from the fact that one chapter has been devoted to European State Aid Control in the 
Handbook of Antitrust Economics. Yet, most of the analysis about the practice of European 
state aid control is model- and econometric analysis-free and could not go beyond suggesting 
some principles based on vague and immeasurable definitions. As witnessed by Martin and 
Valbonesi (2006), formal treatments are scanty. According to Spector (2006) this is partly due 
to the lack of interest for this field in the United States, where there is no control for state aid. 
More fundamentally, an evaluation of state aid control from an economic perspective does not 
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include well-defined research questions, but instead an immense array of various fields of 
economics.  
 
As pointed out by Friederiszick et al. (2006), the economics of state aid is connected to 
various areas of economics: first, to public economics, as state aid is an interventionist 
activity by the governments and is financed by taxes; second, to the economics of 
competition, since state aid provides assistance to some companies and, therefore, has the 
potential impact to distort competition; and third, to international trade theory, as state aid 
may alter trading conditions. Indeed, most of the previous literature on the potential impact of 
state aid has centered more on competition between member countries to grant state aid 
instead of considering the competitive effects of state aid within an integrated market. 
Beginning with Collie (2000), this strand of the literature asked the question of whether the 
prohibition of state aid increases overall welfare.  
 
Ignoring non-economic or political expositions for state aid such as the inclination of 
governments to assist non-competitive and inefficient domestic firms and to support 
employment in specific sectors for political interests, Collie (2000) presents a partial 
equilibrium analysis of the welfare effects of production subsidies -which are proxies for state 
aid- in a homogenous good Cournot oligopolistic industry located within a single integrated 
market. His model can be seen as a two-stage game where at the first stage the national 
governments set production subsidies to maximize their national welfare and firms compete in 
a Cournot oligopoly at the second stage. Collie’s models main finding is that the multilateral 
prohibition of subsidies would raise welfare of all countries hence providing a rationale for a 
general ban of state aid. However, two possible sources of deficiencies emerge in his model. 
Firstly, considering product differentiation instead of homogenous goods case, one might 
conjecture that product differentiation would reduce the impact that one jurisdiction’s subsidy 
will have on the firms located in other jurisdictions. In other words, when products are 
adequately differentiated, the rationale for the multilateral ban or control on subsidies may be 
tapered. Secondly, switching from Cournot oligopoly to Bertrand oligopoly might change the 
results considerably. Taking these issues into consideration, Collie (2002) presents a 
symmetric model with identical firms where they produce differentiated products and market 
structure is either Cournot or Bertrand oligopoly. A production subsidy was used as a proxy 
for state aid as in Collie (2000).  His main results indicate that under both Cournot and 
Bertrand oligopoly, if the products are adequately close substitutes then there is a range of 
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values where the Nash equilibrium subsidy is positive and where the multilateral prohibition 
of subsidies will raise the welfare of all countries. On the other hand, if the products are 
differentiated enough then there is a range of values where the Nash equilibrium subsidy is 
positive and where the multilateral prohibition of subsidies will reduce the welfare of all 
countries under both Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly. Assuming Bertrand oligopoly instead 
of Cournot oligopoly does not change the results in a considerable way.  
 
Even though these two articles give a flavor as to why member states tend to give state aid 
and why the European Commission (EC) would prohibit them, they have been subject to 
criticism based on the fact that production subsidies –which are proxies for state aid in these 
articles- are not allowed under EC state aid control policy, and that state aid for investment 
and research and development (R&D) are more germane to the prevailing policy. Based on 
these critiques, Collie (2005) augmented the analysis in Collie (2000, 2002) by including the 
investment or R&D decisions of firms, and adding subsidies to investment or R&D given by 
the member states. In order to model R&D, he considered a non-strategic case in which firms 
set output and R&D simultaneously, whereas he thought of a strategic case so as to model 
investment where firms set investment given subsidies, and then firms set output given 
investment decisions. Under this set up, he showed that when there are no spillovers, the 
prohibition of state aid to investment will raise welfare. In a similar vein, welfare will increase 
if state aid to R&D is prohibited when spillovers are low. On the other hand, when the 
spillovers to R&D are at a moderate level, whether the ban on state aid to R&D will raise or 
reduce welfare hinges on the opportunity cost of government revenue. Finally, the prohibition 
of state aid will always decrease welfare when the spillovers from R&D are large enough.   
 
As opposed to this general literature on subsidies, which are built upon models that are akin to 
models in the strategic trade, tax competition and rent-seeking literature, Martin and 
Valbonesi (2006, 2008) focus on the idea that the incentive to provide state aid is 
endogenously determined by the process of market integration. That is, they consider the idea 
that the process of market integration itself creates pressure for granting state aid, since 
market integration may result in exit by firms absent state aid. Apart from political arguments, 
they come up with the explanation that market integration activates an exit process by firms 
and consequently generates incentives for governments to subsidize their inefficient domestic 




One should bear in mind that the models considered so far examine incentives of governments 
to grant state aid and these models except Martin and Valbonesi (2006, 2008) are models of 
symmetric oligopoly. Different from these models that try to come up with pure economic 
explanations to the incentives of governments to give state aid, Møllgaard (2005) focuses on 
how state aid distorts competition by conferring competitive advantages to firms receiving 
them. A priori, the resulting equilibrium is asymmetric as long as state aid is existent. Another 
distinct feature of Møllgaard’s model is that he models state aid as reducing the cost of capital 
to the firm rather than assuming that state aid decreases the recipient’s marginal costs. In turn, 
state aid in the form of reduction in the cost of capital enables the recipient firm to invest 
more and the competitors to invest less in quality. Consequently, the recipient’s price adjusted 
for the quality will be lower than the case that would materialize under a level playing field. 
In the extreme case where the aid is colossal, the demand-boosting investments in quality are 
of significant importance, and/or investments in cost reducing process innovation are 
substantial, then the non-recipient firm might be required to exit the market, which means that 
state aid may be predatory.   
 
A more thorough analysis of the distortions of competition induced by state aid was 
performed by Garcia and Neven (2005). They consider three variants of state aid (state aid 
affecting marginal cost, subsidies affecting entry and subsidies affecting the degree of vertical 
product differentiation) and analyze whether specific market characteristics are robust 
indicators of the intensity of the distortions under these three different scenarios. The authors 
find that in all three scenarios, an increase in market concentration is conducive to an increase 
in price distortions that are borne by both domestic and foreign firms supporting the premise 
that state aid is more probable to abet distortions in concentrated markets. Furthermore, 
intense domestic rivalry proxied by low product differentiation or low margins is not a robust 
indicator of the intensity of distortions, since its impact hinges on the type of state aid, which 
suggests that the degree of rivalry should be evaluated carefully when measuring the 
magnitude of the distortion. Lastly, a greater degree of market segmentation in all three cases 
will protect the foreign firm from state intervention and raise the distortion experienced by 
domestic firms. 
 
In addition to forms of state aid mentioned in the models above, other types of state aid 
relevant to the economics of competition are rescue and restructuring subsidies that are 
subject to strict regulation in the European Union. These rescue and restructuring subsidies 
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known as bailouts are granted not only on political grounds but also on economic grounds. 
For instance, if a firm in failing conditions is a monopolist in supplying nationwide services 
required for economic activities such as railways, then a bailout might be imminent to prevent 
a huge negative externality on the whole economy. Besides, if the bankruptcy of a firm in 
jeopardy leads to enormous job losses in a region with high rates of unemployment, a bailout 
may also be justified. A general formal treatment for rescue and restructuring subsidies is 
proposed by Glowicka (2008). She considers an asymmetric duopoly model (asymmetric in 
the sense that firms have asymmetric production costs) with two firms located in a different 
jurisdiction and selling in a common market. These firms restructure so as to decrease their 
unit production costs and then compete in a Cournot setting. Her results suggest that if cost 
asymmetry is not too large and the restructuring aid granting country is small enough, the 
subsidy saves the inefficient firm (which she calls successful rescue), increases the welfare of 
the intervening country by raising the profits of the aid recipient and reduces the surplus of all 
consumers in the integrated market. On the other hand, if the cost differential between firms is 
excessive, the subsidy is granted, yet it does not avert the subsidized firm from leaving the 
market (which she calls failed rescue).  
 
In practice, the effectiveness of bailouts in Europe has been of a great concern, as only 
between 1992 and 2003, 79 firms going through difficulties were shored up with firm-specific 
aid of which total corresponds to billions of Euros (Glowicka, 2008, p. 21).  In an attempt to 
measure the effectiveness of rescue and restructuring aid in Europe, Chindooroy et al. (2007) 
study the survival of companies having been granted rescue or restructuring aid in the EU 
between 1995 and 2003. Employing a one-period discrete choice model, they find that a high 
fraction of firms receiving rescue aid corresponding to about 50% were not able to survive. 
Besides, failure among restructuring aid recipients is less prevalent (about 20 %). A more 
comprehensive analysis regarding the effectiveness of rescue and restructuring aid was 
performed by Glowicka (2008). She analyzes rescue and restructuring aid conferred to 79 
firms from 10 European countries between 1992 and 2003. More specifically, she estimates 
the hazard rates for all these rescue and restructuring aid recipients’ survival. Her results 
indicate that in the first four years after the state aid, firms leave the market at an increasing 
rate, which suggests that the firms went bankrupt with a delay. 29% of the recipients exit 
anyway. She ascribes such high bankruptcy rates to possible deficiencies in the European 
Commission’s decision-making process, as bailouts of firms with low probabilities for 




Apart from studies analyzing the effectiveness of rescue and restructuring aid, the only study 
measuring the effectiveness of state aid at a sector level was conducted by Friederiszick et al. 
(2003).  Stated more precisely, Friederiszick et al. (2003) examine the effectiveness of state 
aid in boosting the efficiency of railways in the 15 EU countries by estimating a stochastic 
frontier production function for the incumbent monopolists during the period 1988-2000. 
Their results reveal a positive link between aid level and efficiency, while the results suggest 
that aid intensity has a negative impact on efficiency. Moreover, they also show that in 
member states with lower aid intensity, aid brings about more investment in comparison to 
countries with higher aid intensity. 
 
To sum up, competition scrutiny of state aid is of crucial importance in order to distinguish 
good state aid from bad state aid. Nonetheless, the relevant economics literature has not 
grown up yet to provide economic principles to evaluate the potential impact of state aid on 
competition. 
 
3. Institutions and Data 
The Legal and Procedural Framework for State Aid Control in the EU 
As can be seen from the literature focusing on competition between member countries to 
grant state aid and on competitive effects of state aid, state aid control is crucial to assure a 
level playing field for European firms and to prevent European governments from involving 
in lavish subsidy races for which the taxpayers would have to bear the expenses.  
 
Article 107 (ex Article 87 of TEC) of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU) (“Treaty” hereafter) regulates the main principles concerning state aid. More 
specifically, Article 107(1) puts that state aid is, in essence, incompatible with the common 
market2
                                                 
2 ‘‘Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in 
any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the 
production of certain goods shall, insofar as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the 
common market.” 
. However, this incompatibility principle does not mean an absolute prohibition of 
state aid as such. Articles 107(2) TFEU and 107(3) TFEU of the Treaty stipulate several cases 
where state aid can be deemed permissible. Particularly, for the majority of approved state aid 
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cases, the most pertinent clauses are 107(3)(a)3 and 107(3)(c)4 of the Treaty. The European 
Commission (“Commission” hereafter) is given the authority to control these cases under 
Article 1085
 
 of the Treaty. State aid rules are only applicable to measures fulfilling the criteria 
outlined in Article 107(1) TFEU, which are:  
• Transfer of state resources: State aid rules concern only measures engaging in a 
transfer of state resources (e.g., aid by national or local authorities). Nevertheless, it 
does not necessarily have to be the case that aid is granted by the State itself. It might 
also be given by a private or public intermediary delegated by the State. 
• Economic advantage: The aid should provide an economic advantage to the recipient 
that would not have had under regular conditions. 
• Selectivity: State aid must be selective and therefore it impacts the balance between 
recipient firms and their rivals.  
• Impact on competition and trade: Aid must have the potential to affect competition 
and trade between Member States. 
 
There are also the cases in which that even though a measure qualifies all the criteria listed 
above; it is not covered under the scope of Article 107(1) TFEU. These are small amounts of 
aid, which are called de minimis aid and are not supposed to have any impact on competition 
and trade.  
 
There are also several competent bodies for the application of state aid rules for various 
sectors. For instance, for the aid granted in the sectors related to the production and marketing 
of agricultural and fisheries products, the state aid units of the DG Agriculture and Rural 
Development and the DG Maritime Affairs and Fisheries are responsible. For state aid to 
transport sectors, the state aid unit of DG Energy and Transport is the competent body. 
Likewise, DG Energy and Transport is also competent for the application of state aid rules to 
the coal sector. Finally, aside from the DG Agriculture and Rural Development, DG Maritime 
                                                 
3 “aid to promote the economic development of areas where the standard of living is abnormally low or where 
there is serious underemployment;” 
4 “aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain economic areas, where such aid 
does not adversely affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest;”  
5 “The Commission shall, in cooperation with Member States, keep under constant review all systems of aid 
existing in those States. It shall propose to the latter any appropriate measures required by the progressive 
development or by the functioning of the common market.”  
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Affairs and Fisheries and DG Energy and Transport, DG Competition is competent for aid 
measures in all remaining sectors.  
 
The regulation of state aid rests on a system of ex ante authorization. According to this 
system, member countries have to notify the Commission of any plan to grant state aid and 
this aid is not put into effect before it has been approved by the Commission, which has the 
authority under Article 108 of the Treaty. States cannot grant any aid unless they have 
notified and have been allowed by the Commission. Any state aid, which is conferred absent 
the Commission consent, is accordingly put down as “unlawful aid”. 
 
Recently, the Commission has initiated a process of simplification of state aid procedures, 
which will make it quicker and easier to grant specific types of state aid. For this purpose, the 
Commission has adopted several block exemption regulations. But, in 2008, these regulations 
were replaced by a new General Block Exemption Regulations (GBER) that combines the 
existing framework and launches new sorts of measures to be exempted from the notification 
requirement. Consequently, member countries can grant aid that satisfies the requirements 
pronounced in the GBER without notifying the Commission beforehand.  
 
Having described the legal framework, we explain the data used in our study and present 
summary statistics in the next section. For a more detailed description of the legal framework, 
one can refer to Vademecum on state aid rules. 
 
Data Sources and Description of Variables 
The relevant data for this study has been extracted from the competition cases database of the 
EC. Besides, for further details for each case, we have looked at the Official Journal of the 
European Communities. The sample of state aid cases considered in this study includes 
regional and sectoral aid together with the following horizontal aid schemes: training, 
innovation, employment, energy saving, rescuing firms in difficulty, research and 
development, SMEs (small- and medium size enterprises), restructuring firms in difficulty, 
environmental protection, services of general economic interest, remedy for a serious 
disturbance in the economy, and other aid. These state aid cases were approved by the EC 
over the period 1998-2009. Note that for these cases DG Competition was the competent body 
for the application of state aid rules. Therefore, state aid cases for which DG Agriculture and 
Rural Development, DG Maritime Affairs and Fisheries and DG Energy and Transport were 
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the competent bodies have been excluded from our analysis. In total, we have 550 
observations.  
 
For each state aid case we collected information on the following: 
 
Dependent Variable 1: Duration of state aid cases 
We have collected the beginning and end dates for each state aid case. None of these dates are 
censored. There are several reasons to focus on state aid duration. Firstly, duration is one of 
the most important ingredients of the so-called proportionality test, which ensures that the 
duration, intensity and scope of the aid must be proportional to the importance of the desired 
outcome. For instance, in cases where market failures -which are among the most noteworthy 
justifications for state aid approval-, are long-lasting, a longer duration of aid is required. 
Alternatively, some forms of state aid are considered to have a (more) distortive impact if aid 
is conferred over a longer period of time. Consequently, measuring duration of state aid will 
tell a lot about the extent of state aid control in Europe.      
 
Dependent Variable 2: Total budget of state aid cases 
The amount of total budget allocated for each state aid case has also been collected. These are 
in Euros and adjusted for inflation. The budget is also one of the most important ingredients 
of the so-called proportionality test mentioned above. For instance, in cases where market 
failures -which are among the most noteworthy justifications for state aid approval-, are 
chronicle, a higher amount of budget is required.   
 
Dependent Variable 3: Daily budget of state aid cases  
Finally, we have generated a variable by dividing the total budget by the duration of state aid 
cases. These are also in Euros and adjusted for inflation. This will tell us how “intense” an aid 
is.  
 
Independent Variables:  
Country dummies: These dummy variables indicate in which member state, aid was 
granted. In total, there are 27 country dummies, covering all EU-27 member states.  
Primary objective of cases: These are dummy variables indicating the primary 
objectives of state aid cases. These primary objectives refer to regional and sectoral aid 
together with the horizontal aid schemes mentioned above. 
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Average real GDP change during state aid case: This variable is the average real 
GDP change during state aid case. The inclusion of this variable is due to the fact that state 
aid duration and budget is affected by macroeconomic conditions.  
Industry dummies: These dummy variables show to which industry aid is conferred or 
in which industry aid recipient operates. This classification is made according to NACE Rev 2 
level.  
Year dummies: These are dummy variables showing in which year the state aid case 
was approved by the EC. We have included this in order to control for approval year fixed 
effects. 
 
However, one should bear in mind that it might also be the case that an aid has multiple 
objectives (for instance, an aid might have both the objectives of energy saving and 
environmental protection) and/or that aid is given to several industries (for instance, an aid 
might be given to all industries in an underdeveloped region). In order to control for these, 
several dummy variables have been created. The definitions of these variables can be found in 
Table 1.  
 
<INSERT TABLE 1 HERE> 
 
Sample Statistics 
Tables 2 and 3 provide summary statistics for all state aid cases in the sample, the former 
including the crisis measures and the latter excluding the crises measures (crises measures 
refer to aid given to as a remedy for a serious disturbance in an economy). The average 
duration of state aid in our sample is approximately 859 days, with a standard deviation of 
654 days. Most of state aid cases in our sample consist of aid given in large economies. 
German state aid cases dominate the sample with 90 observations, followed by 72 Italian and 
67 British cases of state aid. Apart from Malta (with 1 observation), Lithuania, France, and 
Luxembourg are the top 3 countries in terms of state aid duration. Furthermore; Luxembourg, 
Netherlands and Denmark are the countries where state aid has the highest level of total 
budget. As to daily state aid budget, the Netherlands and the U.K. rank top together with 
Luxembourg. On the other hand, when crisis measures are excluded, the top 3 member states 
for state aid duration do not change, while France, Ireland and Romania rank top for both 




Furthermore, Table 4 demonstrates that manufacturing industries receive state aid for many 
times. According to the same table, the highest daily budget belongs to those cases of aid 
given to the industries of financial and insurance activities. Besides, aid given to the industries 
of accommodation and food service activities, of real estate activities, and of public 
administration and defense; compulsory social security has the longest mean duration, while 
aid given to the industry of financial and insurance activities has the shortest mean duration. 
On the other hand, the highest amount of both daily and total budget belongs to the aid 
conferred to the industry of financial and insurance activities. Finally, Table 5 shows mean 
daily budgets and durations for each state aid objective. According to the Table 5, remedy for 
serious disturbance aid has both the shortest mean duration and the highest mean total and 
daily budget.  
 
Table 6 presents mean duration, daily and total budget of state aid cases by selected 
characteristics. According to the table, for those cases of aid given to a single industry, 
duration is longer and, total and daily budget is higher for aid with multiple objectives. Table 
6 further indicates higher amounts of both daily and total budget for those cases of aid 
conferred to a single industry compared to cases of aid given to multiple industries. 
 
<INSERT TABLE 2 HERE> 
 
<INSERT TABLE 3 HERE> 
 
<INSERT TABLE 4 HERE> 
 
<INSERT TABLE 5 HERE> 
 
<INSERT TABLE 6 HERE> 
 
Preliminary Tests 
Before proceeding with econometric evaluation, we have also performed log-rank and 
Wilcoxon (Breslow) tests for equality of survivor functions across several groups. These tests 
are global tests in the sense that they compare the overall survivor functions rather than 
testing the equality of the survivor functions at a specific time point. The null hypothesis of 
the tests may be stated in hazards, that is, H0 = h1(t) = h2(t). Table 7 presents the results of 
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these tests. In both tests, equalities of survivor functions are rejected for aid with single 
objective versus aid with multiple objectives. On the other hand, there is no statistical 
difference between the survivor functions of aid given to single industry and aid given to 
multiple industries.  
 
One might also want to perform a stratified test in which the test is performed separately for 
different subgroups of the sample. Table 8 demonstrates the results of these stratified tests. 
The results show that even accounting for being an aid given to multiple industries, we still 
find a significant difference between the survivor functions of aid with single objective and 
aid with multiple objectives. Yet, accounting for being an aid having multiple objectives, we 
do not find a statistical difference between the survivor functions of aid given to single 
industry and aid given to multiple industries.  
 
Having presented the descriptive statistics on European state aid cases and the results of 
preliminary tests, we now turn to the econometric analysis of the determinants of state aid 
duration and state aid budget. 
 
<INSERT TABLE 7 HERE> 
 
<INSERT TABLE 8 HERE> 
 
4. Econometric Methodology 
a. Determinants of State Aid Duration 
Non-parametric Estimation 
To help understand state aid duration, we first calculate Kaplan-Meier (1958) estimates of the 
survivor function , which is the probability of survival after time . In Figure I we plot the 
Kaplan-Meier estimate for the overall observations in our dataset. The estimated probability 
of survival decreases sharply in the first 1,095 days of a state aid’s life. In Tables 9 and 10 we 
compare the estimated survivor functions of state aid based on various characteristics. These 
tables indicate that state aid with multiple objectives has a better survival experience than 
state aid with single objective. To be more precise, as can be seen from Table 9, the 
probability of surviving after 955 days is % 38 for state aid with single objective, while it is % 
60 for state aid with multiple objectives. On the other hand, the probability of surviving after 
15 
 
955 days is % 42 for state aid given to a single industry, while it is % 26 for state aid given to 
multiple industries. However, interpreting the differences in estimates of the survivor 
functions might be misleading, because this method does not control for the remaining state 
aid characteristics. To disentangle the effects of those characteristics, we analyze state aid 
duration using multivariate parametric techniques in the next section.  
 
<INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE> 
 
<INSERT TABLE 9 HERE> 
 




The determinants of state aid duration are estimated using parametric accelerated failure-time 




where  is oddly distributed. The term “accelerated” is employed in describing these models, 
since instead of assuming that time to failure  has some form of distribution, a distribution is 




where  is the acceleration parameter. If , then time goes by 
at its normal rate. If , then time goes by faster for the observational unit 
(which is state aid cases in our analysis), and therefore end would be expected to come 
sooner. On the other hand, if , then time passes at a slower pace, and thus 
failure would be expected to take place later.    
 





 where the distribution of  is specified.  
 
In what follows, we will econometrically investigate the following two different 
specifications: 
 
       
(1) 
 
            
(2) 
 
For each specification, we will consider exponential, Weibull, log-normal, log-logistic and 
Gamma regressions. The differences in these regressions originate from how we specify the 
distribution of . For instance, in exponential regression we assume that  is distributed as 




where  follows the extreme value distribution. For these regressions, the distribution of  is 
summarized below: 
 
Table 11: A Summary of Regressions in Accelerated Failure Time Metric 
Regression Distribution of τj Distribution of uj 
Exponential Exponential{exp(β0)} The extreme value (Gumbel) distribution 
Weibull Weibull(β0, p) The extreme value (Gumbel) distribution 
Log-normal Lognormal(β0,σ) Standard normal distribution with (0,σ) 
Log-logistic Loglogistic(β0,γ) Logistic distribution with (0, πγ/3) 




Having run all these regressions for each specification, we choose the model which fits the 
data best according to Akaike Information Criterion and interpret the results.  
 
b. Determinants of State Aid Budget 
The amount of aid appears to be one of the most indubitable measures to gauge the likely 
effects on competition. Even though the conventional intuition envisages that more aid is 
associated with more distortion, there are reasons to be skeptical about this statement. For 
instance, huge amounts of aid might be required to correct market failures in an effective way 
in industries such as banking. Correcting those market failures with huge sums of money will 
not harm but enhance competition. Thus, a massive sum of aid might well be pro-competitive. 
On the other hand, small amounts of aid might also have considerable impact within a small 
relevant market. For instance, aid given to SMEs in a small geographic area might result in 
distortion of competition in that market. Overall, the final impact of the budget of state aid 
depends on specific industry conditions such as market shares of the recipients, the level of 
product differentiation etc. Yet, even though the amount of aid cannot tell the likely effects of 
aid on competition per se, it might tell us about the extent of European state aid control.  
 
In what follows, we will examine the determinants of state aid budget. We have two different 
dependent variables. The first one is the natural logarithm of the total budget of state aid 
(ln_budget) and the second one is the daily budget of aid in million Euros (daily_budget_m). 
To be more precise, the specifications of the models to be estimated are: 
   
       
(3) 
 
       





       
(5) 
 
       
    
(6) 
 
However, estimating this model with the standard linear regression may not be appropriate in 
this set up. Since the budget data is highly skewed and characterized by influential 
observations, we will focus on quantile regression (QR) rather than standard linear regression. 
In other words, the QR analysis is more appropriate in our setup, as it is not as sensitive as the 
OLS regression to the presence of outliers.  
 
To express more mathematically in a budget equation setting, the qth regression quantile, 




QR estimator  minimizes over  the objective function above. We use  instead of  to 
indicate that different choices of  yield different values of . If, say, , then more 
weight is put on prediction for observations with  then for observations with 
. A particular case is when  is set to be 0.5, giving the least absolute-
deviations estimator (also known as median regression) that minimizes .  
 
The usual gradient optimization methods to solve for this optimization problem cannot be 
used, since the objective function is not differentiable. Instead, it can be solved by linear 




The estimator that minimizes  is an  estimator with being asymptotically normal 
under general conditions. For more detailed information, see Cameron and Trivedi (2005, p. 
88). 
 
5. Estimation Results and Interpretation 
a. Determinants of State Aid Duration 
Table 12 displays the results from various accelerated failure-time models for the first 
specification. In this specification, Netherlands (nl) is left out as the comparison base for the 
countries. For the fixed year effects, 2005 (dum2005) is excluded. Moreover, since cases of 
state aid given in a particular jurisdiction might be correlated and may not be independent, 
because they are conferred by the same governmental body, we have clustered individual state 
aid cases on member states in order to get robust standard errors obtained via the 
Huber/White/sandwich estimator of the variance. After the estimation of the specification, in 
order to choose the best model from this class of nonnested parametric models, Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) can be used (Cleves et al. 2008, p. 273). To be more specific, the 
preferred model is the one with the lowest value of the AIC. For parametric duration analysis 




where  is the log-likelihood,  is the number of variables and  is the number of model-
specific distributional parameters.   
 
For the first specification the minimum AIC value is obtained after Weibull regression6
                                                 
6 Together with Weibull regression, exponential, log-normal, log-logistic and Gamma forms have also been 
estimated. 
. 
Therefore, we will restrict our attention to Weibull regression when interpreting the 
estimation results. Note that negative parameter estimates imply that duration decreases with 
the variable of interest, while positive parameter estimates refer to increased duration 
associated with the variable. Firstly, state aid with multiple objectives has better prospects to 
endure, ceteris paribus. Exponentiating the multiple_objectives coefficient we see that state 
aid with multiple objectives last 45 % longer than state aid with the same characteristics but 
single objective, as 1 – exp (0.3701) = -0.4479. Also, we can say that time passes 31 % slower 
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for state aid with multiple objectives than for those with a single objective, everything else 
being equal. This is because exp (-0.3701) = 0.6907. This finding might be resulting from the 
fact that the multiple purposes that some state aid schemes serve might be complementary, 
and in order to have the desired effects, the EC is convinced that aid should have a longer 
duration. On the other hand, we report statistically insignificant results for aid given to 
multiple industries (multiple_industries).  
 
As to member state dummies and approval year dummies, they are jointly statistically 
significant. Not surprisingly, average change in real GDP seems to be negatively associated 
with duration of state aid cases, as gdp_avg has a negative but statistically insignificant 
coefficient.  
 
<INSERT TABLE 12 HERE> 
 
In Table 13 we report the results from accelerated failure-time Weibull model for the second 
specification, as the minimum AIC value is obtained after Weibull regression. In doing so, we 
split our sample and restrict our attention to the cases of state aid with single objective and 
given to a single industry. In this specification, aid given to SMEs is left out as the base group 
in order to make comparisons among aid objectives. Similarly, aid given to manufacturing 
industries is left out as the base group for industries. Moreover, since cases of state aid given 
in a particular jurisdiction and in a particular industry might be correlated and may not be 
independent, because they are conferred by the same governmental body, and affected from 
common shocks, we have clustered individual state aid cases on industries in member states in 
order to get robust standard errors obtained via the Huber/White/sandwich estimator of the 
variance.  
 
<INSERT TABLE 13 HERE> 
 
The results indicate that average change in real GDP (gdp_avg) is negatively and statistically 
significantly (at 5 % level) linked to state aid duration. This finding suggests that governments 
are inclined to give state aid in longer durations when macroeconomic conditions are 
relatively worse. As to the comparison of state aid duration based on the objectives, we find 
that aid given for purposes of R&D or innovation (rd_innovation) and regional aid (regional) 
seem to last statistically significantly (at 5 % and 10 % significance levels, respectively) 
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longer than aid given to SMEs. To be more precise, aid given for purposes of R&D or 
innovation and regional aid survive 50 % and 29 % longer, respectively, than SME aid, ceteris 
paribus. On the other hand, aid for rescuing firms in difficulty (rescue) and remedy for a 
serious disturbance in the economy (remedy) last statistically significantly (at 1 % 
significance level) shorter than aid given to SMEs. Stated more explicitly, rescue aid and 
remedy aid last 55 % and 63 % shorter, respectively than SME aid everything else being 
equal. It is not surprising to find that rescue aid lasts shorter, as it reduces effective 
competition by supporting inefficient production, and accordingly, the EC will be stricter 
about its duration length. This can also be seen from the fact that rescue aid can only be 
granted for a maximum of six months by law.  
 
As to the comparison of state aid duration based on the sectors, on one hand, we find that aid 
in industries of real estate activities (real estate); and public administration and defense, 
compulsory social security (public administration & defense) appears to last statistically 
significantly longer (52 % and 152 % longer, respectively) compared to aid given to 
manufacturing industries, everything else being equal. These industries can be characterized 
as being industries where public goods are not provided by the market up to an efficient level 
because it is not lucrative to do so.  For instance, affordable housing for low-income 
households might be undersupplied in real estate industry just because it is not profitable. 
Moreover, public administration and defense can also be held as an example to public goods, 
for which it is impossible to exclude anyone from using them.  
 
On the other hand, aid conferred to the industries of agriculture, forestry and fishing 
(agriculture); water supply, sewerage, waste management and remediation activities (water & 
waste); information and communication (information and communication); financial and 
insurance activities (financial & insurance); professional, scientific and technical activities 
(professional & scientific); and, arts, entertainment and recreation (arts) is statistically 
significantly less likely to end up earlier ( 23 %,  35 %, 22 %, 32 %, 41 and  35 % shorter, 
respectively) than aid given to manufacturing industries. Among these industries with a 
history of relatively shorter state aid duration, financial sectors are the most noteworthy ones. 
As previously mentioned, these financial industries such as banking are important input 
markets with a high potential to affect trade flows. Alternatively, the EC might have 
employed high levels of budget intensities instead of longer duration in state aid given in 
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these industries (see the next subsection). Finally, as in the first specification, country and 
year dummies are jointly significant.  
 
Having estimated the determinants of state aid duration, we now turn to the determinants of 
state aid budget in the next section. 
 
b. Determinants of State Aid Budget 
Table 14 presents the results for the determinants of the state aid budget for the third 
specification. The second, third and fourth column displays the estimation results for 25th, 
50th, and 75th quantiles, respectively. The fifth and sixth columns include the results of 
hypothesis tests of equality of the regression coefficients at different conditional quantiles. 
Finally, the last column shows OLS estimates in order to compare to quantile regression 
estimation results.  
 
First of all, one should note that the coefficients vary across quantiles. Most evidently, the 
highly statistically significant explanatory variable multiple_objectives (aid with more than 
one objective to achieve) has a bigger effect at the lower conditional quantiles of state aid 
budget (25th and 50th) while gdp_avg (average change in real GDP during the course of state 
aid in that country) has a greater impact at the highest conditional quantile (75th). The 
standard errors slightly vary at different conditional quantiles. Moreover, OLS coefficients 
differ significantly from the quantile regression coefficients. The null hypothesis of 
coefficient equality is rejected at a level of 0.05 for multiple_objectives while we cannot reject 
it for variables multiple_industries and gdp_avg. Finally, country and year dummies are 
jointly significant for each quantile and OLS regression. 
 
Focusing on the results of median regression (50th quantile), we can see that average change 
in real GDP (gdp_avg) is negatively and statistically significantly (at 1 % level) linked to total 
state aid budget. This finding suggests that governments tend to give and the EC is more 
likely to approve state aid in greater amounts when macroeconomic conditions are relatively 
worse. Elsewhere, multiple_objectives has a positive and statistically significant (at 1 % level) 
coefficient implying that total state aid budget is greater in amount for those cases of state aid 
with multiple objectives compared to state aid a single objective, everything else being equal. 
Excluding aid given as a remedy for serious disturbance in an economy (since its budget is 
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enormously high), aid with multiple objectives has an excess total budget of about €38 million 
compared to state aid having a single objective, everything else being equal7
 
. On the other 
hand, we report statistically insignificant results for aid given to multiple industries 
(multiple_industries).  
<INSERT TABLE 14 HERE> 
 
Table 15 provides estimation results for the fourth specification. In doing so, we split our 
sample and restrict our attention to the cases of state aid with single objective and given to a 
single industry. Firstly, the coefficients and standard errors differ considerably across 
quantiles. Secondly, in general, the standard errors are smaller for the lower and upper 
quantiles (25th and 75th) than median regression (50th), demonstrating more precision at the 
tails of the distribution. In this specification, average change in real GDP appears to be 
negatively linked to the total budget of state aid cases, as gdp_avg has a negative but 
statistically insignificant coefficient in all quantile regressions and OLS.  Focusing on median 
regression (50th quantile) results, we see that sectoral aid (sectoral), regional aid (regional), 
aid given for purposes of R&D or innovation (rd_innovation), environmental aid 
(environmental) and aid as a remedy for a serious disturbance in the economy (remedy) have 
statistically significantly higher amounts of total budget relative to SME aid, ceteris paribus. 
On the other hand, the total budget is statistically significantly less for training aid (training) 
compared to SME aid, everything else being equal.  
 
As to the comparison of total state aid budget based on the sectors, we report that the total 
budget of aid given in industries of real estate activities (real estate) seems to be statistically 
significantly higher than that of aid given in manufacturing industries, while cases of aid 
given in industries of transporting and storage (transporting & storage); professional, 
scientific and technical activities (professional & scientific); and arts, entertainment and 
recreation (arts) have statistically significantly higher amounts of total budget relative to state 
aid conferred in manufacturing industries, ceteris paribus. Finally, country and year dummies 
are jointly significant.  
 
                                                 
7 This value is obtained by the multiplication of the coefficient of multiple_objectives by the multiplier that 
converts quantile regression coefficients in logs to average marginal effect in levels. For detailed information see 
Cameron and Trivedi (2009). 
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<INSERT TABLE 15 HERE> 
 
The estimation results for the fifth specification are displayed in Table 16. The results suggest 
that the coefficients and the standard errors vary slightly across different quantiles. Focusing 
on median regression (50th quantile) we see that aid with more than one objective to achieve 
(multiple_objectives) has a statistically significantly (at 10 % level) greater daily budget than 
state aid with the same characteristics but single objective. However, we report statistically 
insignificant results for aid given to multiple industries (multiple_industries) and average 
change in real GDP (gdp_avg). As in the previous estimations, country and year dummies are 
jointly significant. 
 
<INSERT TABLE 16 HERE> 
 
Finally, Table 17 presents the estimation results for the sixth specification. In this 
specification we split our sample and focus on the cases of state aid with single objective and 
given to a single industry. Most of the explanatory variables have a bigger effect at the upper 
conditional quantiles of daily state aid budget (75th) while the standard errors are smaller for 
the lower quantile (25th) than median regression and upper quantiles (50th and 75th), implying 
more precision at the lower tail of the distribution. To be consistent with previous 
interpretations, we restrict our attention to median regression results. We report that, sectoral 
aid (sectoral), regional aid (regional) and aid as a remedy for a serious disturbance in the 
economy (remedy) have statistically significantly greater amounts of daily budget relative to 
that of SME aid. If we were to examine daily state aid budget based on the industries, we only 
report that the daily budget of aid given in industries of real estate activities (real estate) 
seems to be statistically significantly higher (at 10 % level) than that of aid given in 
manufacturing industries, everything else being equal. 
 
<INSERT TABLE 17 HERE> 
 
6. Discussion and Conclusion 
Having estimated the determinants of state aid duration and budget, we have ranked the 
objectives for which and the industries to which aid is conferred based on duration and the 
amount of total and daily budget. As Table 18 suggests, when other variables are controlled 
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for, the top three state aid objectives with longest duration are aid given for services of 
general economic interest, R&D or innovation aid, and environmental aid. On the other hand, 
remedy for serious disturbance aid, energy saving aid, and rescue aid have the shortest 
durations, everything else being equal. As to the total budget ranking, remedy for serious 
disturbance aid, sectoral aid, and environmental protection aid have the highest amount of 
total budgets while training aid, energy saving aid and employment aid have the least amount 
of total aid budget.  
 
<INSERT TABLE 18 HERE> 
 
These rankings suggest that the EC is keen on eliminating negative externalities, since 
environmental protection aid, which is thought to be in the sphere of negative externalities, 
has both a very long duration and a very high amount of total budget. This long duration and 
high amount of budget incentivize companies, which are constrained by additional costs, to 
deliver environmental gains. Furthermore, aid given for services of general economic interest 
draws a special attention in this context, as it has both a long duration and high amount of 
total budget, too. As stated by Nicolaides (2003), services of general economic interest 
(SGEI) occupy a specific position in the economies of the member states of EU. These 
services are not necessarily public goods that are under-supplied or not supplied by the 
market. Instead, SGEI are services for supplies of which member states impose specific terms 
and prices. Thus, at the heart of the problem lies the inadequacy of suppliers to cover their 
costs due to the conditions imposed on them by member states. According to the rankings 
based on our estimations, the EC approves cases of aid given for services of general economic 
interest with a longer duration and a higher amount of budget so as to prevent those 
inadequacies. Finally, the length of R&D or innovation aid might be associated with keeping 
companies incentivized for a long time so as to counter-weigh inefficiencies in R&D activities 
due to market failures. However, the budget of R&D or innovation aid is at a modest level, 
since subsidies for R&D may also distort competition. For instance, a successful process 
innovation may have a distortionary impact on pricing and entry/exit decisions by decreasing 
the firm’s fixed or variable costs of production.  
 
Elsewhere, remedy for serious disturbance aid has the shortest duration and the highest level 
of both daily and total budget. In order to overcome serious disturbances in the economy in an 
effective way, huge amounts of aid might be required. But the gigantic amount spent on 
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correcting those disturbances might also have undesired impact on effective competition in a 
market. In order to keep that undesired effect to a minimum, the duration of this type of aid is 
set to be very short. Following remedy for a serious disturbance aid, sectoral aid has the 
second highest level of total budget. Sectoral aid consists of aid to facilitate the development 
of certain economic activities in certain sectors of the economy. These sectors include 
shipbuilding, transport, broadcasting, coal, steel etc. Facilitating the development of overall 
economic activities in these industries necessitates huge sums of money, which explains why 
sectoral aid has a very high level of total budget. But sectoral aid has also a short duration, as 
in the case of remedy for serious disturbance aid, to keep the undesired effects to minimum. 
 
On the other hand, it is not surprising to find that rescue aid both lasts shorter and has 
relatively low levels of budget, as it reduces effective competition by supporting inefficient 
production, and accordingly, the EC will be stricter about its duration length and aid budget. 
This can also be seen from the fact that rescue aid can only be granted for a maximum of six 
months by law.  
 
Elsewhere training and employment aids have both relatively shorter durations and less 
amounts of budget. Even though these types of aid are seen as benevolent, one might also take 
into account that the EC has issued a warning that employment aid might result in adverse 
effects that might offset the immediate effects of job creation; they could even lead to 
distortions in competition in the long run. Consequently, as put by Bree (2003), there is a 
tension between employment assistance and competitiveness.  
 
As to the rankings of industries to which aid is given based on duration and budget, when 
other variables are controlled for, the top three industries with longest duration are industries 
of public administration and defense; compulsory social security; real estate activities; and 
accommodation and food service activities. On the other hand, the industries of real estate 
activities; of accommodation and food service activities; and of manufacturing rank top in 
terms of total budget. The longevity and the enormity of aid in industries of real estate 
activities reveal that aid with longer duration and with a high level of budget is given to 
industries that can be characterized as being industries where public goods are not provided 
by the market up to an efficient level because it is not lucrative to do so.  For instance, 
affordable housing for low-income households might be undersupplied in real estate industry 
just because it is not profitable. In contrast, even though aid given to industries of public 
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administration and defense; compulsory social security has the longest duration, it has the 
least amount of budget. More interestingly, aid given to the industries of accommodation and 
food service activities has both relatively longer durations and higher levels of budget.  
 
This paper has provided an analysis of the European Commission (EC) decisions on state aid 
control. In doing so, we have adopted a positive approach rather than a normative approach, 
explaining what the state of affairs is instead of what the state of affairs ought to be. We have 
characterized the last decade of European state aid control policy in summary statistics and, 
detailed quantile regression and duration analysis on 550 state aid cases in total.  
 
In this analysis, we have considered three imperfect proxies to measure the impact of state 
aid: duration of state aid, total budget of state aid and daily budget of state aid. While 
interpreting the estimation results, we mainly focused on the first two measures. By using 
these imperfect proxies, we have attempted to explain the extent of European state aid control.  
We are well aware of that both duration and budget information are clearly unsatisfactory in 
capturing the economic impact of state aid. It might be the case that state aid has continued to 
exist on paper for months with little impact on market structure. Alternatively, even though 
billions of Euros have been spent for the sake of aid, it might have little sustained effect on, 
say, facilitating economic activities in an industry. Ideally, we would like to compare the 
prices, number of firms, competition level, profits and so on that prevailed with what would 
have occurred absent the state aid. However, in order to perform this kind of rigorous 
counterfactual analysis we need very detailed and specific information for cases of aid, which 
is clearly missing in the current set up. Given the information that we have, we find that aid 
with multiple objectives to achieve has both longer durations and higher amounts of budget. 
We also see that for some aid objectives or industries, the EC approves cases of aid with both 
longer durations and higher levels of budget. On the other hand, for some class of aid 
objectives and industries, there is a trade-off between duration and the level of budget so as to 
counter-balance the undesired effects.  
 
According to Heidhues and Nitsche (2006) it is obvious that EU state aid control has evolved 
over time. What once was originally intended to address concerns about export subsidies and 
strategic trade has now become Article 107 TFEU, which is the legal basis for state aid 
control in Europe. In the light of the findings above, the emphasis of state aid control is more 
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Table 1: Variables and Definitions 
Core  Characteristics 
multiple_objectives 1 = aid has more than one objective to achieve 
multiple_industries 1 = aid is given to several industries 
ln_budget Log of total budget of state aid 
daily_budget_m Daily budget of aid in million Euros (inflation adjusted) 
Primary Objective Dummies 
training 1 = Training  
regional 1 = Regional aid 
sectoral 1 = Sectoral aid 
rd_innovation 1 = Research and development or innovation 
employment 1 = Employment 
energy 1 = Energy saving 
rescue 1 = Rescuing firms in difficulty 
sme 1 = SMEs (small- and medium size enterprises) 
restructuring 1 = Restructuring firms in difficulty 
environmental 1 = Environmental protection 
general interest 1 = Services of general economic interest 
remedy 1 = Remedy for a serious disturbance in the economy 
other 1= Other 
Industry Dummies 
agriculture 1 = Aid is given to the industry of agriculture, forestry and fishing 
mining 1 = Aid is given to the industry of mining and quarrying 
manufacturing  1 = Aid is given to the industry of manufacturing 
electricity & gas 1 = Aid is given to the industry of electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 
water & waste  1 = Aid is given to the industry of water supply; sewerage; waste management and remediation activities 
construction 1 = Aid is given to the industry of construction 
motor 1 = Aid is given to the industry of wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 
transporting & storage 1 = Aid is given to the industry of transporting and storage 
accommodation 1 = Aid is given to the industry of accommodation and food service activities 
information & communication 1 = Aid is given to the industry of information and communication 
financial & insurance 1 = Aid is given to the industry of financial and insurance activities 
real estate 1 = Aid is given to the industry of real estate activities 
professional & scientific 1 = Aid is given to the industry of professional, scientific and technical activities 
public administration & defense 1 = Aid is given to the industry of public administration and defense; compulsory social security 
arts 1 = Aid is given to the industry of arts, entertainment and recreation 
other services 1 = Aid is given to the industry of other services activities 
Country Dummies 
at 1 = Aid is given in Austria 
be 1 = Aid is given in Belgium 
cy 1 = Aid is given in Cyprus 
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cz 1 = Aid is given in Czech Republic 
dk 1 = Aid is given in Denmark 
ee 1 = Aid is given in Estonia 
fi 1 = Aid is given in Finland 
fr 1 = Aid is given in France 
de 1 = Aid is given in Germany 
gr 1 = Aid is given in Greece 
hu 1 = Aid is given in Hungary 
ie 1 = Aid is given in Ireland 
it 1 = Aid is given in Italy 
lv 1 = Aid is given in Latvia 
lt 1 = Aid is given in Lithuania 
lux 1 = Aid is given in Luxembourg 
mt 1 = Aid is given in Malta 
nl 1 = Aid is given in Netherlands 
pl 1 = Aid is given in Poland 
pt 1 = Aid is given in Portugal 
ro 1 = Aid is given in Romania 
sk 1 = Aid is given in Slovakia 
si 1 = Aid is given in Slovenia 
es 1 = Aid is given in Spain 
se 1 = Aid is given in Sweden 
uk 1 = Aid is given in United Kingdom 
Macro Variables 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4: Sample Statistics According to the Breakdown of Industries 
 
 Industries 
Daily Budget in million  €s Total Budget in million  €s Duration in days 
n Mean Std. Dev. n Mean Std. Dev. n Mean Std. Dev. 
agriculture 27 0.01 0.01 27 3.57 6.41 27 648.96 486.94 
mining 4 0.01 0.01 4 10.78 20.12 4 955.50 658.93 
manufacturing 241 0.07 0.24 241 52.66 147.84 241 1,047.41 645.05 
electricity & gas 14 0.13 0.22 14 54.80 122.22 14 950.07 992.21 
water & waste 1 0.00 - 1 0.84 - 1 730.00 - 
construction 9 0.06 0.11 9 101.66 179.94 9 1,205.44 627.79 
motor 12 0.07 0.19 12 14.23 28.75 12 794.67 448.55 
transporting & storage 31 0.05 0.18 31 46.89 197.60 31 695.81 589.56 
accommodation 24 0.19 0.53 24 93.43 190.70 24 1,246.46 767.88 
information & communication 16 0.05 0.06 16 57.31 71.73 16 1,151.25 611.64 
financial & insurance 68 298.18 636.90 68 57,649.41 102,243.00 68 254.47 158.41 
real estate 1 0.15 - 1 218.09 - 1 1,460.00 - 
professional & scientific 8 0.09 0.23 8 92.27 255.23 8 465.75 473.27 
public administration &defense 1 0.00 - 1 0.50 - 1 1,521.00 - 
arts 1 0.00 - 1 0.62 - 1 730.00 - 
other services 38 0.01 0.03 38 6.70 23.53 38 718.92 573.07 
 All 496 40.93 255.81 496 7,944.90 42,523.67 496 867.24 658.98 
 
 
Table 5: Sample Statistics According to the Breakdown of Objectives  
 
Objectives 
Daily Budget in million  €s Total Budget in million  €s Duration in days 
n Mean Std. Dev. n Mean Std. Dev. n Mean Std. Dev. 
training 153 0.01 0.02 153 3.95 12.26 153 757.95 449.32 
regional 60 0.09 0.15 60 80.77 134.51 60 1,212.13 560.29 
sectoral 1 0.11 - 1 77.82 - 1 730.00 - 
rd_innovation 62 0.05 0.11 62 53.75 160.84 62 1,123.39 760.73 
employment 9 0.43 0.84 9 159.76 302.98 9 492.33 262.25 
energy 1 0.00 - 1 0.32 - 1 454.00 - 
rescue 9 0.65 1.02 9 85.61 167.16 9 282.11 226.33 
sme 94 0.03 0.07 94 19.37 39.20 94 799.12 690.67 
restructuring 5 0.35 0.75 5 199.43 403.86 5 1,057.80 416.80 
environmental 26 0.11 0.20 26 79.67 228.48 26 1,083.39 736.13 
general interest 4 0.73 0.45 4 787.04 517.91 4 912.00 364.67 
remedy 56 296.44 650.77 56 50,241.24 79,801.95 56 221.68 103.73 

















































































































































































































































































Table 7: Log-Rank and Wilcoxon (Breslow) Tests for Equality of Survivor Functions 
 
Log-Rank Test Wilcoxon (Breslow) Test 
  Observed Expected   Observed Expected Sum of Ranks 
Single Objective 480 449.78 Single Objective 480 449.78 9279 
Multiple Objectives 70 100.22 Multiple Objectives 70 100.22 -9279 
           
Total 550 550.00 Total 550 550.00 0 
           
chi2(1) = 12.25 chi2(1) =  12.27 
Pr>chi2 = 0.0005 Pr>chi2 = 0.0005 
  
 
    
  
  
  Observed Expected   Observed Expected Sum of Ranks 
Single Industry 497 503.14 Single Industry 497 503.14 -1825 
Multiple Industries 53 46.86 Multiple Industries 53 46.86 1825 
           
Total 550 550.00 Total 550 550.00 0 
  
 
    
  
  
chi2(1) =  0.93 chi2(1) =   0.70 
Pr>chi2 = 0.3343 Pr>chi2 = 0.4026 
 
 
Table 8: Stratified Tests for Equality of Survivor Functions 
 
Stratified Log-Rank Test (by Multiple Industries) Stratified Log-Rank Test (by Multiple Objectives) 
  Events Observed 
Expected Events 





Single Objective 480 449.22 Single Industry 497 506.13 
Multiple Objectives 70 100.78 Multiple Industries 53 43.87 
            
Total 550 550.00 Total 550 550.00 
(*) sum over calculations within multiple_industries (*) sum over calculations within multiple_objectives 
chi2(1) =  12.95 chi2(1) =  2.24 






Non-Parametric Analysis of State Aid Duration 
 





Table 9: Kaplan-Meier Estimator for Aid Objectives 
 
    Survival Probability 




7 0.9979 1 
481 0.6125 0.7714 
955 0.3833 0.6000 
1429 0.1854 0.3714 
1903 0.0563 0.0857 
2377 0.0208 0.0857 
2851 0.0021 0.0286 
3325 0.0021 0.0286 
3799 - 0.0143 


















Table 10: Kaplan-Meier Estimator for Aid Receiving Industries 
 
    Survival Probability 




7 0.9980 1.0000 
481 0.6298 0.6604 
955 0.4266 0.2642 
1429 0.2113 0.1887 
1903 0.0604 0.0566 
2377 0.0282 0.0377 
2851 0.0060 - 
3325 0.0060 - 
3799 0.0020 - 








Table 12: Determinants of the Duration of State Aid Cases for the First Specification  
 
Duration in days Weibull Regression 
constant 6.6987 *** 
 (0.1889) 
 
multiple_objectives 0.3701 *** 
 (0.0821) 
 
multiple_industries -0.0928  
 (0.0944) 
 





at 0.2091 * 
 
(0.1200) 
 be 0.4638 *** 
 
(0.1219) 
 cy -0.6478 *** 
 
(0.1455) 












 fi 0.3238 *** 
 
(0.1064) 
 fr 0.5858 *** 
 
(0.1067) 
 de 0.1842 * 
 
(0.1111) 
 gr 0.5083 *** 
 
(0.1557) 
 hu -0.3431 *** 
 
(0.1236) 
 ie 0.2820 ** 
 
(0.1246) 




 lv -1.0856 *** 
 
(0.2386) 
 lt 0.8274 *** 
 
(0.1683) 
 lux 0.7851 *** 
 
(0.1827) 
 mt 0.6917 *** 
 
(0.1564) 
 pl 0.6103 *** 
 
(0.1708) 
 pt 0.2585 ** 
 
(0.1231) 
 ro 0.5959 *** 
 
(0.1138) 
 sk 0.5617 *** 
 
(0.1464) 
 si -0.6823 *** 
 
(0.1463) 















Table 12: Determinants of the Duration of State Aid Cases for the First Specification 
(Continued) 
 
Duration in days Weibull Regression 
Year Dummies 
  dum1998 0.3508 * 
 
(0.1911)  
dum1999 -0.0889  
 
(0.4015)  
dum2000 0.7544 *** 
 
(0.1915)  
dum2001 0.4907 *** 
 
(0.1757)  
dum2002 0.2727 * 
 
(0.1401)  
dum2003 0.2536 ** 
 
(0.1269)  
dum2004 -0.1181  
 
(0.1596)  
dum2006 0.0521  
 
(0.1362)  
dum2007 -0.3103 ** 
 
(0.1443)  
dum2008 -0.3987 *** 
 
(0.1456)  
dum2009 -1.0197 *** 
 (0.2410) 
 





























Table 13: Determinants of the Duration of State Aid Cases for the Second Specification 
(given for a single objective and to a single industry) 
 
Duration in days Weibull Regression 
constant 6.5422 *** 
 (0.2621) 
 





training -0.0450  
 (0.1839) 
 
sectoral -0.1161  
 (0.3444) 
 
regional 0.2540 * 
 (0.1478) 
 
rd_innovation 0.4025 ** 
 (0.1992) 
 
employment -0.4613  
 (0.3129) 
 
energy -0.8045  
 (0.5166) 
 
rescue -0.7983 *** 
 (0.3089) 
 
restructuring -0.0198  
 (0.2245) 
 
environmental 0.3229  
 (0.2712) 
 
general interest 0.4421  
 (0.3966) 
 





agriculture -0.2655 * 
 (0.1413) 
 
mining 0.0051  
 (0.0968) 
 
electricity & gas -0.1629  
 (0.3184) 
 
water & waste -0.4371 *** 
 (0.1051) 
 
construction -0.1085  
 (0.1645) 
 
motor -0.1293  
 (0.1434) 
 
transporting & storage -0.1933  
 (0.2292) 
 
accommodation 0.0781  
 (0.1569) 
 
information & communication -0.2518 ** 
 (0.1186) 
 
financial & insurance -0.3863 ** 
 (0.1583) 
 
real estate 0.4174 *** 
 (0.1234) 
 
professional & scientific -0.5209 *** 
 (0.1751) 
 
public administration & defense 0.9227 *** 
 (0.1899) 
 
arts -0.4371 *** 
 (0.1051) 
 






Table 13: Determinants of the Duration of State Aid Cases for the Second Specification 
(given for a single objective and to a single industry) (Continued) 
 
Duration in days Weibull Regression 
Countries   at 0.5954 ** 
 (0.2318) 
 
be 0.7414 *** 
 (0.1990) 
 
cy -0.2733  
 (0.2419) 
 
cz 0.0739  
 (0.2127) 
 
dk 0.1815  
 (0.2092) 
 
ee 0.5848 * 
 (0.3473) 
 
fi 0.4929 * 
 (0.2993) 
 
fr 0.7462 *** 
 (0.1901) 
 
de 0.2861  
 (0.1967) 
 
gr 0.8113 *** 
 (0.2644) 
 
hu 0.1482  
 (0.1684) 
 
ie 0.0080  
 (0.1884) 
 
it 0.2455  
 (0.1883) 
 
lv -0.4003 * 
 (0.2433) 
 
lt 1.0246 *** 
 (0.3664) 
 
lux -1.8523 *** 
 (0.2649) 
 
pl 0.9899 *** 
 (0.3441) 
 
pt 0.6084 *** 
 (0.1765) 
 
ro 1.0399 *** 
 (0.2243) 
 
sk 0.6681 *** 
 (0.1998) 
 
si 0.1472  
 (0.1792) 
 
es 0.4532 * 
 (0.2368) 
 
se 0.3078  
 (0.2020) 
 












Table 13: Determinants of the Duration of State Aid Cases for the Second Specification 
(given for a single objective and to a single industry) (Continued) 
 
Duration in days Weibull Regression 
Year Dummies   dum1998 0.4917 * 
 (0.2578) 
 
dum1999 0.0046  
 (0.2474) 
 
dum2000 0.5944 ** 
 (0.2581) 
 
dum2001 0.4203 ** 
 (0.2052) 
 
dum2002 0.2894 * 
 (0.1647) 
 
dum2003 0.2746 ** 
 (0.1268) 
 
dum2004 -0.1412  
 (0.1572) 
 
dum2006 -0.1717  
 (0.1672) 
 
dum2007 -0.4924 *** 
 (0.1657) 
 
dum2008 -0.2594  
 (0.1736) 
 
dum2009 -0.0562  
 (0.2227) 
  























Table 14: Determinants of the Budget of State Aid Cases for the Third Specification  
Quantile Regression Test of Equality for 
Coefficients OLS 
ln_budget q25 q50 q75 F-Statistic p-value 
constant 12.3793 *** 13.7923 *** 17.5595  11.50 0.000 14.9794  
 
(0.7015)  (1.0396)  (0.9636)  (0.4148)  




(0.4436)  (0.4937)  (0.4847)  (0.4124)  




(0.7833)  (0.4298)  (0.4448)  (0.6882)  
gdp_avg -0.2327 * -0.2844 *** -0.3417 *** 0.37 0.694 
-0.3186 ** 
 







   
 




 (1.3987)  (1.7448)  (0.3312)  




 (1.2225)  (0.8358)  (0.3506)  




 (1.8030)  (1.4389)  (0.3548)  




 (1.5725)  (1.3546)  (0.5904)  




 (1.5361)  (1.6539)  (0.3733)  




 (1.8358)  (1.3185)  (0.5067)  




 (1.5193)  (2.2184)  (0.3211)  




 (1.2567)  (1.2866)  (0.2552)  




 (1.1471)  (0.8779)  (0.2732)  




 (1.2866)  (1.8534)  (0.2558)  




 (2.7138)  (2.9147)  (0.5151)  




 (1.1161)  (1.2366)  (0.3223)  




 (1.0033)  (1.0114)  (0.2827)  




 (2.3025)  (1.8409)  (1.3811)  




 (1.7305)  (1.7418)  (0.6019)  




 (1.6175)  (2.2848)  (0.6339)  




 (1.0386)  (1.0007)  (0.6556)  




 (1.5125)  (1.3373)  (0.4391)  




 (1.4758)  (1.4660)  (0.2897)  




 (2.4240)  (1.5489)  (0.5914)  




 (1.4746)  (1.2474)  (0.3566)  




 (2.7791)  (2.8089)  (0.4024)  




 (1.1721)  (1.0332)  (0.2354)  




 (1.0054)  (0.9833)  (0.3213)  




 (1.0758)  (1.0361)  (0.2120)  
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Table 14: Determinants of the Budget of State Aid Cases for the Third Specification 
(Continued)  
 
Quantile Regression Test of Equality for Coefficients OLS 
ln budget q25 q50 q75 F-Statistic p-value 






   
 
dum1998 4.6834 *** 1.6072 *** 0.7258  5.50 0.004 
2.5413 *** 
 
(0.7492)  (0.5342)  (0.7205)  (0.3804)  
dum1999 3.6143 *** 3.2325 ** 1.7080  1.04 0.355 
2.7197 *** 
 
(1.2573)  (1.2695)  (1.2584)  (0.6504)  
dum2000 3.4552 *** 2.0858 *** 1.6856 ** 1.11 0.330 
2.0252 ** 
 
(0.8002)  (0.6459)  (0.6922)  (0.7369)  
dum2001 1.3878  0.8554  0.2944  0.34 0.714 
0.7856  
 
(1.1934)  (0.8873)  (0.8008)  (0.7417)  
dum2002 0.7106  1.0834 ** 0.7019  0.21 0.811 
0.8178  
 
(1.1757)  (0.4894)  (0.6268)  (0.4858)  
dum2003 0.8301  -0.1587  -0.2515  1.42 0.242 
0.0561  
 
(1.0249)  (0.6640)  (0.7072)  (0.4253)  
dum2004 -0.6071  -0.1846  -0.3502  0.09 0.911 
-0.3812  
 
(0.8851)  (0.6524)  (0.7007)  (0.4754)  
dum2006 1.3775 *** 0.3437  0.9217  1.56 0.211 
0.9199  
 
(0.5098)  (0.5931)  (0.6459)  (0.6065)  
dum2007 0.9342  -0.1508  -0.4075  1.52 0.220 
-0.0183  
 
(0.6393)  (0.5497)  (0.4412)  (0.5578)  
dum2008 1.1575  0.1893  0.3917  0.63 0.531 
1.0391  
 
(0.8113)  (0.7856)  (0.6346)  (0.7805)  




(1.0219)  (1.2444)  (0.9641)  (0.9276)  
Statistics                     
Observations 550 550 550   550 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.22 0.28 0.35     





Table 15: Determinants of the Budget of State Aid Cases for the Fourth Specification 
(given for a single objective and to a single industry) 
 
Quantile Regression Test of Equality for Coefficients OLS 
ln_budget q25 q50 q75 F-Statistic p-value 




 (0.9035)  (0.8189)  (0.7620)  











   
 




 (0.6139)  (0.5174)  (0.6142)  
sectoral 5.6633 ** 3.5618 * 3.2872 * 2.08 0.127 
3.9454 *** 
 (2.8431) 
 (2.0722)  (1.6855)  (0.6580)  




 (0.3640)  (0.5521)  (0.6089)  




 (0.7095)  (0.5502)  (0.6181)  




 (1.8729)  (1.5367)  (1.1469)  




 (2.6103)  (2.6197)  (1.9287)  




 (1.1066)  (0.9392)  (0.8929)  




 (1.6783)  (2.0473)  (1.1057)  




 (1.1067)  (1.2675)  (0.8318)  




 (3.4658)  (3.0778)  (2.0609)  



















Table 15: Determinants of the Budget of State Aid Cases for the Fourth Specification 
(given for a single objective and to a single industry) (Continued) 
 
Quantile Regression Test of Equality for Coefficients OLS 







   
 




 (0.7797)  (0.6343)  (0.7929)  




 (0.3440)  (0.7612)  (0.3319)  




 (0.9147)  (1.3535)  (0.5814)  





 (0.2123)  (0.4111)  (0.3210) 




 (1.1243)  (0.9776)  (1.0059)  




 (0.3159)  (0.3341)  (0.4679)  




 (0.8015)  (0.7269)  (0.5451)  




 (0.6888)  (1.2373)  (0.5649)  




 (0.5650)  (0.5350)  (0.6205)  




 (1.6706)  (1.3776)  (0.9138)  




 (1.4338)  (1.0180)  (1.0810)  




 (0.8875)  (0.8908)  (0.6401)  




 (1.5170)  (2.1024)  (0.8575)  




 (0.2632)  (0.4192)  (0.3210)  




 (0.7314)  (0.8774)  (0.6640)  






   
 




 (1.8241)  (1.9052)  (0.7608)  




 (0.9133)  (0.8286)  (0.5852)  




 (1.1063)  (1.0902)  (0.8524)  




 (0.6442)  (0.7476)  (0.5992)  




 (0.5491)  (0.5411)  (0.4437)  




 (0.6075)  (0.4928)  (0.4781)  




 (0.6856)  (0.8493)  (0.5207)  




 (0.5265)  (0.6393)  (0.5270)  




 (0.6758)  (0.6858)  (0.5904)  




 (0.5809)  (0.5807)  (0.7369)  




 (0.7879)  (1.0192)  (0.8797)  
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Table 15: Determinants of the Budget of State Aid Cases for the Fourth Specification 
(given for a single objective and to a single industry) (Continued) 
 
Quantile Regression Test of Equality for Coefficients OLS 







   
 




 (1.1924)  (1.1624)  (0.9451)  




 (0.8747)  (0.9241)  (0.7330)  




 (1.5797)  (1.2807)  (1.1218)  




 (1.2116)  (1.0520)  (0.8407)  




 (0.9486)  (0.8540)  (0.6224)  




 (2.4521)  (2.1165)  (1.4757)  




 (1.3124)  (1.5241)  (0.8407)  




 (1.0418)  (0.9355)  (0.6252)  




 (0.9179)  (0.8542)  (0.7186)  




 (1.5595)  (1.6825)  (0.9976)  




 (1.2890)  (1.3158)  (0.7465)  




 (1.3081)  (1.4903)  (1.2095)  




 (1.0347)  (0.9311)  (0.7770)  




 (0.8851)  (0.8954)  (0.9867)  




 (1.8935)  (1.6323)  (1.2955)  




 (1.1031)  (1.1272)  (0.7962)  




 (0.9063)  (1.1021)  (0.9011)  




 (0.8517)  (0.7303)  (0.8786)  




 (1.6506)  (1.0880)  (1.0477)  




 (1.9314)  (2.6718)  (1.5360)  




 (0.8601)  (1.2458)  (0.7487)  




 (1.1716)  (0.9107)  (0.7904)  




 (1.0521)  (1.0002)  (1.3334)  




 (1.0708)  (0.8914)  (0.7428)  
Statistics                     
Observations 438 438 438   438 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.50 0.55 0.62     
R-Squared           0.78 
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Table 16: Determinants of the Daily Budget of State Aid Cases for the Fifth 
Specification 
 
Quantile Regression Test of Equality for Coefficients OLS 
daily_budget_m q25 q50 q75 F-Statistic p-value 
constant 0.0019  0.0067  0.0646  0.05 0.955 63.0875  
 (0.0026)  (0.0162)  (3.4909)  (45.3412)  
multiple_objectives 0.0048  0.0124 * 0.0098  0.49 0.613 10.6750 
 
 (0.0039)  (0.0066)  (0.0201)  (38.5244)  
multiple_industries 0.0002  0.0053  0.0159  0.32 0.728 -24.8566 
 
 (0.0073)  (0.0066)  (0.0189)  (23.8813)  
gdp_avg -0.0008  -0.0026  -0.0124  0.40 0.673 -12.4145 
 
 (0.0011)  (0.0052)  (0.0181)  (11.4436)  
Countries           
at 0.0019  0.0233  0.0130  1.55 0.214 -60.6757 
 
 (0.0029)  (0.0187)  (3.6282)  (50.5954)  
be -0.0010  -0.0168  -0.0533  0.65 0.524 -58.1192 
 
 (0.0012)  (0.0113)  (3.4821)  (49.4079)  
cy 0.0024  0.0025  -0.0012  0.00 1.000 -59.7534 
 
 (0.0040)  (2.9921)  (3.4550)  (49.7187)  
cz 0.0053  0.0177  0.0259  0.05 0.955 -11.5086 
 
 (0.0152)  (0.0301)  (3.4510)  (65.3482)  
dk -0.0003  0.0040  -0.0167  0.02 0.976 -39.5413 
 
 (0.6210)  (0.0143)  (173.3429)  (59.1140)  
ee 0.0047  0.0189  0.0596  0.15 0.857 -1.5910 
 
 (0.0072)  (0.0375)  (3.4305)  (59.5206)  
fi 0.0030  0.0028  -0.0396  0.00 1.000 -85.6364 
 
 (4.8788)  (48.8383)  (103.8482)  (62.7229)  
fr 0.0111 * 0.0247 * 0.3364  0.13 0.879 -6.9315 
 
 (0.0059)  (0.0131)  (3.5826)  (53.4777)  
de -0.0001  0.0063  -0.0072  0.14 0.867 -52.9457 
 
 (0.0024)  (0.0105)  (3.4850)  (47.2948)  
gr 0.0062  0.0864  0.0956  0.00 1.000 -39.7051 
 
 (0.1977)  (32.9683)  (67.3353)  (48.0227)  
hu 5.0223  -0.0136  37.7748  0.21 0.811 -220.000 
** 
 (11.4658)  (25.1880)  (40.5146)  (95.1683)  
ie 0.0227 ** 0.0167  0.0157  0.00 1.000 -88.2426 
* 
 (0.0111)  (0.0228)  (3.4664)  (50.6723)  
it -0.0004  0.0008  -0.0362  0.00 0.996 -63.2389 
 
 (0.0018)  (0.0116)  (3.4844)  (45.1269)  
lv 11.4144 ** -2.8162  6.7264  0.39 0.678 -370.000 
* 
 (5.0241)  (15.5101)  (135.2182)  (188.9051)  
lt 0.0071  0.0155  0.0428  0.06 0.940 16.8483 
 
 (0.0052)  (0.0318)  (3.4370)  (74.7820)  
lux 0.0023  -0.0026  734.1108 * 2.94 0.054 339.2450 
*** 
 (386.1842)  (429.4428)  (396.2907)  (58.5676)  
mt 0.0043  -0.0184 * -0.2769  1.08 0.339 -97.5646 
 
 (0.0034)  (0.0100)  (3.4883)  (73.6220)  
pl 0.0015  0.0066  -0.0003  0.06 0.945 -36.8607 
 
 (0.0027)  (0.0186)  (3.4698)  (57.2236)  
pt 0.0041  0.0241  2.0469  0.05 0.954 -60.7611 
 
 (0.0350)  (0.0638)  (10.4740)  (44.9415)  
ro 0.0966  0.0894  0.1888  0.00 0.998 -21.6650 
 
 (0.1502)  (0.1860)  (3.5122)  (61.7297)  
sk 0.0106  -0.0060  -0.0009  0.00 1.000 -150.000 
** 
 (2.1116)  (16.9806)  (63.2135)  (55.0523)  
si 59.9467 * 44.8470 ** 61.8057  0.21 0.812 -140.000 
* 
 (31.4261)  (19.2451)  (72.8015)  (71.3753)  
es 0.0012  0.0034  0.0073  0.01 0.987 -38.1732 
 
 (0.0015)  (0.0076)  (3.4707)  (44.8966)  
se 0.0114  0.0467  0.0278  0.63 0.535 -150.000 
** 
 (0.0407)  (0.1669)  (3.5121)  (61.5673)  
uk 0.0005  0.0011  -0.0220  0.00 0.999 31.4253 
 




Table 16: Determinants of the Daily Budget of State Aid Cases for the Fifth 
Specification (Continued) 
 
Quantile Regression Test of Equality for Coefficients OLS 
daily_budget_m q25 q50 q75 F-Statistic p-value 






   
 




 (0.0086)  (0.0374)  (22.9721)  




 (0.0357)  (0.0507)  (37.9623)  




 (0.0078)  (0.0352)  (30.2054)  




 (0.0066)  (0.0164)  (16.0634)  




 (0.0044)  (0.0169)  (10.6385)  




 (0.0042)  (0.0072)  (9.1656)  




 (0.0039)  (0.0117)  (9.9389)  




 (0.0046)  (0.0523)  (20.1345)  




 (0.0053)  (0.0242)  (12.8280)  




 (0.0086)  (0.2263)  (28.2331)  




 (14.4954)  (127.9637)  (113.1653)  
Statistics                     
Observations 550 550 550   550 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.01 0.02 0.12     

























Table 17: Determinants of the Daily Budget of State Aid Cases for the Sixth 
Specification (given for a single objective and to a single industry) 
Quantile Regression   Test of Equality for Coefficients OLS 
daily_budget_m q25   q50   q75   F-Statistic p-value 
constant -0.0021  -0.0029  0.0370  0.67 0.514 75.3090  
 (0.0067) 
 (0.0170)  (117.9931)  (60.9718) 











   
 




           (0.0042)  (0.0088)  (19.6369)  




           (0.0514)  (0.0451)  (20.1752) 





           (0.0100)  (0.0204)  (19.2411) 





           (0.0103)  (0.0228)  (23.5679) 




           (0.0061)  (0.8584)  (34.0082)  




           (0.2434)  (0.2438)  (296.6408)  




           (0.4761)  (0.7807)  (43.0360)  





           (0.5045)  (0.7619)  (48.0825) 





           (0.1571)  (0.1950)  (35.4635) 





           (0.4539)  (0.5019)  (70.6964) 











   
 




 (0.0034)            (0.0067)  (28.2907)  




 (0.0032)            (0.0092)  (19.6841)  




 (0.2385)            (0.2258)  (44.9508)  





 (0.0036)            (0.0085)  (18.9462) 




 (0.0052)            (0.3593)  (29.7700)  




 (0.0009)            (0.1465)  (27.8997)  





 (0.0026)            (0.0025)  (22.8737) 




 (0.0091)            (0.0371)  (41.4179)  




 (0.3884)            (0.0727)  (46.8248)  




 (0.1175)            (0.3876)  (44.0951)  





 (0.0647)            (0.0518)  (92.5429) 





 (18.7867)            (112.3704)  (62.3098) 





 (0.0132)            (118.0078)  (53.8658) 





 (0.0033)            (0.0090)  (18.9462) 





 (0.0022)            (0.0042)  (29.6554) 
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Table 17: Determinants of the Daily Budget of State Aid Cases for the Sixth 
Specification (given for a single objective and to a single industry) (Continued) 
 
Quantile Regression   Test of Equality for Coefficients OLS 







   
 




           (0.0200)  (118.0057)  (75.4130)  




           (0.0175)  (117.9997)  (70.6166)  




           (18.7774)  (158.6170)  (116.4535)  





           (0.0175)  (0.0346)  (132.5640) 




           (163.7989)  (190.1900)  (85.3361)  




           (0.0393)  (118.0085)  (137.5142)  




           (82.7560)  (251.1705)  (126.9270)  





           (0.0269)  (118.0476)  (60.3869) 




           (0.0168)  (117.9977)  (70.5498)  





           (11.3413)  (118.0055)  (82.5910) 




           (60.0436)  (248.9697)  (150.3196)  




           (50.2398)  (127.6887)  (185.3056)  





           (0.0173)  (117.9990)  (59.6178) 




           (59.8578)  (254.4775)  (263.7539)  





           (0.0234)  (118.0272)  (141.8904) 




 (416.7362)  (320.2553)  (140.6431)  




           (0.0246)  (118.0212)  (109.2815)  




           (18.9687)  (118.0016)  (86.1480)  





           (0.0346)  (117.9987)  (62.9485) 




           (72.3893)  (216.0442)  (185.4211)  




           (54.4314)  (243.9282)  (120.2351)  




           (0.0155)  (118.0110)  (66.4915)  




           (0.3539)  (117.9725)  (120.6183)  










Table 17: Determinants of the Daily Budget of State Aid Cases for the Sixth 
Specification (given for a single objective and to a single industry) (Continued) 
 
Quantile Regression   Test of Equality for Coefficients OLS 
daily_budget_m q25   q50   q75   F-Statistic p-value 






   
 




 (0.3637)            (0.4949)  (30.4599)  




 (0.0456)            (0.0496)  (55.2698)  




 (0.0252)            (0.0322)  (41.4910)  




 (0.0070)            (0.0092)  (29.1867)  




 (0.0028)            (0.0080)  (15.7982)  




 (0.0033)            (0.0052)  (14.3339)  




 (0.0036)            (0.0048)  (19.1613)  




 (0.0036)            (0.0192)  (23.8739)  




 (0.0055)            (0.0097)  (23.5158)  




 (0.0048)            (0.0136)  (30.8654)  




(3.0021)  (14.9575)            (100.6195)  (89.3943)  
Statistics                     
Observations 438 438 438     438 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.10 0.15 0.28       
























Table 18: Ranking of State Aid Objectives and Industries Based on Duration, Total 
Budget and Daily Budget after Estimations 
 
Duration Ranking Total Budget Ranking Daily Budget Ranking 
Rank Objectives  Rank Objectives  Rank Objectives  
1 remedy  1 training  1 energy  
2 energy  2 energy  2 training  
3 rescue  3 employment  3 sme  
4 employment  4 sme  4 employment  
5 sectoral  5 rescue  5 rd_innovation  
6 training  6 restructuring  6 environmental  
7 restructuring  7 rd_innovation  7 restructuring  
8 sme  8 regional  8 regional  
9 regional  9 general interest  9 general interest  
10 environmental  10 environmental  10 rescue  
11 rd_innovation  11 sectoral  11 sectoral  
12 general interest  12 remedy  12 remedy  





Rank Industries  
1 professional & scientific  1 public administration & defense  1 information & communication  
2 water & waste  2 professional & scientific  2 public administration & defense  
3 arts  3 transporting & storage  3 construction  
4 financial & insurance  4 other services  4 agriculture  
5 agriculture  5 agriculture  5 mining  
6 information & communication  6 information & communication  6 transporting & storage  
7 other services  7 construction  7 professional & scientific  
8 transporting & storage  8 arts  8 motor  
9 electricity & gas  9 water & waste  9 financial & insurance  
10 motor 
 
10 electricity & gas  10 other services  
11 construction  11 motor  11 manufacturing  
12 manufacturing 
 
12 mining  12 arts  
13 mining  13 financial & insurance  13 water & waste  
14 accommodation  14 manufacturing  14 accommodation  
15 real estate  15 accommodation  15 real estate  
16 public administration & defense  16 real estate  16 electricity & gas  
 
 
 
 
